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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article étudie diverses familles de principes de population d'un point de vue
axiomatique. En plus de l'utilitarisme avec niveau critique, de l'utilitarisme avec niveau critique
sensible à (ou tempéré par) la taille de la population, et de leurs généralisations, nous
considérons la famille restreinte suggérée par Hurka et nous en proposons deux nouvelles : la
famille restreinte avec niveau critique et la famille restreinte avec niveau critique sensible à la
taille de la population. Certains sous-ensembles de ces familles restreintes possèdent un
niveau critique non négatif et évitent les conclusions répugnantes et sadiques, mais violent
une condition d'indépendance importante. Nous défendons les niveaux critiques positifs.
Mots clés : éthique de population, méthodologie axiomatique
ABSTRACT
This paper examines several families of population principles in the light of a set of
axioms. In addition to the critical-level utilitarian, number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian and
number-dampened families and their generalized counterparts, we consider the restricted
number-dampened family (suggested by Hurka) and introduce two new families : the restricted
critical-level and restricted number-dependent critical-level families. Subsets of the restricted
families have nonnegative critical levels and avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions
but fail to satisfy an important independence condition. We defend the critical-level principles
with positive critical levels.
Key words : population ethics, axiomatic methodology
1. Introduction
The axiomatic method was introduced into population ethics by Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984]
when he accused classical utilitarianism of leading to the repugnant conclusion. Because
average utilitarianism, the only other population principle that was well-known at the
time, does not have this property but has other defects, Parﬁt’s criticism encouraged the
search for population principles that make better trade-oﬀs. Avoidance of the repugnant
conclusion had become an axiom that acceptable principles should satisfy.
The axiomatic investigation of principles for ranking alternatives in a ﬁxed-population
environment began with Arrow’s [1951, 1963] book Social Choice and Individual Values
and, although there is a small body of work that is concerned with population questions,
social-choice theory has, for the most part, ignored those issues.
In this paper, we attempt to test population principles by using axioms that are,
in our view, the ones that are the most attractive on ethical grounds. We investigate
principles that rank alternatives—complete histories of the universe from remote past to
distant future—according to their goodness. All of the principles considered are ‘welfarist’,
using only information about the lifetime well-being (utility levels) of individuals who are
alive (ever live) in the various alternatives.
Welfarist population principles employ only information about the lifetime well-being
of the individuals alive in various alternatives in order to rank them. Although we are
concerned with ranking alternatives and therefore do not need to consider uncertainty, all
the population principles that we investigate can be extended so that they can rank ac-
tions whose consequences are uncertain (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1998, 2001a]).
Because welfarist principles use welfare information alone, it is important that they be
partnered with a comprehensive account of well-being such as the one provided by Griﬃn
[1986] or that of Sumner [1996].
Following standard practice, we normalize utilities so that a lifetime utility of zero
represents neutrality: above neutrality, a life, as a whole, is worth living; below neutrality,
it is not. A neutral life is one which is as good as one in which the individual has no
experiences.1 Because people who do not exist do not have interests or preferences, it does
not make sense to say that an individual gains by being brought into existence with a utility
level above neutrality. Someone might have an attitude, such as a desire or preference,
toward a world in which he or she does not exist but could not reasonably think that
this world would be better or worse for him or her. Similarly, a person who expresses
satisfaction with having been born cannot be claiming that existence is better (for him or
her) than nonexistence. It makes perfect sense, of course, to say that an individual gains
1 See Broome [1993, 1999].
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or loses by continuing to live because of surviving a life-threatening illness, say. Such a
change aﬀects length of life, not existence itself.2
Although we consider only human populations here, it is possible to extend all the
principles to take account of the well-being of sentient non-humans. Sidgwick [1907, 1966,
p. 414] argues that we should “extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and
pain whose feelings are aﬀected by our conduct”. Our simpliﬁcationmakes our presentation
more transparent. Readers who are interested in the extension of welfarist principles to
non-humans are referred to Blackorby and Donaldson [1992].
It is possible to apply population principles to single periods of time but the results
may be inconsistent with timeless application of the same principle and may recommend
killing people whose lives are worth living (see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1996b,
1997b]). For example, the average-utilitarian principle, applied to a single period, recom-
mends the painless killing of people whose level of well-being is below the average as long
as no one else is aﬀected. For that reason, we focus exclusively on the social evaluation of
complete histories using lifetime utilities. In that case, killing shortens a life and does not
change population size. As a consequence, those counterintuitive recommendations do not
arise.
Our investigation uses four basic axioms—strong Pareto, continuity, anonymity and
existence of critical levels—and six additional axioms, ﬁve of which apply to the rank-
ing of alternatives with diﬀerent population sizes. Three axioms in the latter group ask
principles to ignore the utilities or number of those who are ‘unconcerned’ when ranking
alternatives. For any pair of alternatives, the unconcerned individuals are those who are
alive and are equally well oﬀ in both. Same-number independence requires the ranking
of alternatives with the same population size to be independent of the utilities of the un-
concerned, utility independence extends the requirement to diﬀerent population sizes and
existence independence requires the ranking of any two alternatives to be independent of
both the utilities and existence of the unconcerned.
For any alternative, the critical level of utility is that level which, if assigned to
an added person without changing the utility levels of the existing population, creates an
alternative which is as good as the original. We employ an axiom that requires critical levels
to be nonnegative. It ensures that a principle does not sanction the ceteris-paribus creation
of people whose lives are not worth living. The last two axioms ask principles to avoid the
repugnant and the sadistic conclusions. A principle leads to the repugnant conclusion if
any alternative in which each person experiences a utility level above neutrality is ranked as
worse than an alternative in which each member of a larger population is above neutrality
but arbitrarily close to it. A principle implies the sadistic conclusion (Arrhenius [2000]) if
every alternative in which each person’s utility level is below neutrality is ranked as better
2 For discussions, see Heyd [1992, Chapter 1], McMahan [1996] and Parﬁt [1984, Appendix G].
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than some alternative in which each person in a larger population has a utility level above
neutrality.
Although the axioms are desirable on a priori grounds, we state a result in the ap-
pendix (Theorem 2) that shows that there is no population principle that satisﬁes the
basic axioms, utility (and therefore existence) independence, has nonnegative critical lev-
els and avoids both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. It is possible, however, to
ﬁnd population principles that satisfy some but not all of the axioms. We consider the
critical-level utilitarian family (Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]), the restricted critical-
utilitarian family (introduced in this paper), the number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian
family (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000]), the number-dampened utilitarian fam-
ily (Ng [1986]) and the restricted number-dampened utilitarian family (Hurka [2000]).
Although all of these principles rank alternatives with the same population size using
utilitarianism, there are expanded families which rank those alternatives with generalized
utilitarianism. It uses transformed utilities and allows for aversion to utility inequality
(see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000]).
Using our axioms, we examine all these principles and defend the critical-level prin-
ciples with positive critical levels. In addition, the performance of all the principles in the
tests provided by the axioms oﬀers readers a way to rank the principles for themselves.
Section 2 sets out the axioms and Section 3 presents the principles that are consis-
tent with same-number utilitarianism and investigates their consistency with the axioms.
Section 4 provides a defence of the critical-level utilitarian principles with positive critical
levels and Section 5 concludes. The main part of the paper oﬀers several examples but
contains no mathematics: mathematical statements of the axioms, principles and theorems
are in the appendix.
2. The Axioms
Population principles rank alternatives according to their goodness. Although there are
some principles that do not rank all possible alternatives, the principles that we inves-
tigate in this paper provide orderings of alternatives: at-least-as-good-as relations that
are complete, reﬂexive and transitive.3 Each pair of distinct alternatives is ranked, each
alternative is as good as itself and if alternative x is at least as good as alternative y and
y is at least as good as z, x is at least as good as z.4
3 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1996a] and Broome [1999] for discussions of principles that
provide incomplete rankings.
4 Alternative x is as good as alternative y if and only if x is at least as good as y and y is at least as
good as x; x is better than y if and only if x is at least as good as y and it is not the case that y is at least
as good as x. Transitivity of at-least-as-good-as implies transitivity of both as-good-as and better-than
and, in addition, implies that if x is better than y and y is at least as good as z, x is better than z.
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We consider only population principles that satisfy four basic axioms. The ﬁrst of
these is strong Pareto and it applies to alternatives with the same population. Consider
any pair of alternatives, x and y. If each person is equally well oﬀ in both, they are equally
good and, if each person is no worse oﬀ and at least one person is better oﬀ in x, x is better
than y. Because it is possible for the same person to be born at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent
alternatives, this axiom has the eﬀect of ruling out discounting of the well-being of future
generations.5 It can be weakened to accommodate discounting, however (see Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson [1997a]).
Our second basic axiom is continuity. It requires ﬁxed-population trade-oﬀs to be
gradual, without sudden jumps from better to worse.
Our third basic axiom is an impartiality condition called anonymity and it requires
any two alternatives which are the same except for the identities of those alive to be
ranked as equally good. Given strong Pareto, this implies that any two alternatives in
which the same number of people have the same levels of lifetime utility are equally good.
Anonymity provides a solution to Parﬁt’s [1984] ‘non-identity problem’ and ensures all
individual’s interests receive equal treatment.
Anonymous population principles provide a single ordering of utility vectors of all
dimensions. Anonymity requires that any utility vector and the vector that results from
a permutation of its elements are equally good. Alternative x is better than (as good as)
alternative y if and only if the vector of individual lifetime utilities associated with x is
better than (as good as) the vector of utilities associated with y. Both the classical and
average-utilitarian principles are anonymous.
Some of our axioms refer to critical levels which are deﬁned as follows. For any alter-
native, consider another with one additional person alive and suppose that each member
of the common population has the same level of well-being in both. The critical level for
the ﬁrst alternative is that level of utility for the added person that makes the two equally
good. We assume that critical levels exist for all alternatives and call our fourth basic
assumption existence of critical levels.
We assume, without mentioning it explicitly, that all of our four basic assumptions
are satisﬁed. Any principle whose same-number rankings are utilitarian satisﬁes strong
Pareto, continuity and anonymity but those principles are not the only ones that do. The
basic axioms allow priority to be given to the interests of those whose level of well-being
is low. That is, they allow for inequality aversion.
The axioms that follow are not the only ones that have been suggested but they are,
in our view, the most important.
5 See Broome [1994], Cowen [1992] and Cowen and Parﬁt [1992].
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2.1. Independence
Suppose that a single parent has a handicapped child whose lifetime utility would be
zero (neutrality) without the expenditure of additional resources. Two alternatives are
possible. In the ﬁrst, which we call x, resources are devoted to improving the child’s well-
being, resulting in utilities of 5 for the child and 6 for the parent and, in the second, which
we call y, no additional resources are used to raise the level of well-being of the disabled
child, but a second child is born and the same resources are devoted to it resulting in
lifetime utility levels of 6, 0 and 6. The parent and his or her children are not the only
people who ever live, however. There is one other—Euclid—who is long dead and has the
same utility level in both alternatives.6
Parent First Child Second Child Euclid
x 6 5 same in both
y 6 0 6 same in both line
Table 1
The parent wants to know which alternative is better. Parﬁt [1976, 1982] considers this
example and he assumes that utility levels other than those of family members and po-
tential members are irrelevant. That assumption is satisﬁed if principles such as classical
utilitarianism are used to rank the alternatives but not when other principles, such as av-
erage utilitarianism, are used. The classical-utilitarian ranking of x and y is independent
of Euclid’s utility level and even of his existence. But it ranks y as better than x and this
contradicts the moral intuition of many.
If, however, average utilitarianism is used to rank the alternatives, the ranking of x
and y is not independent of Euclid’s level of well-being. If his utility level is 4, average
utility is 5 in x and 4 in y and, if his utility level is −10, average utility is 1/3 in x and
1/2 in y: average utilitarianism declares x to be better if Euclid’s life was good and y to
be better if it was not. In addition, if Euclid’s existence is disregarded, average utility is
3.7 in x and 3 in y so x is regarded as better in this case.
Independence axioms require the ranking of alternatives to be independent of the
utility levels and, in some cases, the existence of people whose well-being or existence are
regarded as morally irrelevant. The simplest of these is same-number independence. It
requires the ranking of any two alternatives with the same population size to be inde-
pendent of the utilities of individuals who are alive and have the same utility levels in
6 This example, without Euclid, is due to Parﬁt [1976, 1982].
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both. Same-number independence is satisﬁed by all the principles considered in this paper
including those based on generalized utilitarianism.
Utility independence requires the ranking of any two alternatives to be independent
of the utility levels of individuals who are alive and have the same utilities in both. It
implies same-number independence but it applies to comparisons in which population sizes
are diﬀerent as well as to those in which they are the same. In the example of Table 1,
utility independence requires the ranking of x and y to be independent of Euclid’s utility
level but not necessarily of his existence.
Existence independence requires the ranking of any two alternatives to be independent
of the existence of individuals who are alive and have the same utility levels in both. It is
the strongest of the independence axioms and implies the other two.7 It allows population
principles to be applied to aﬀected individuals only.
Which independence axiom is appropriate for population ethics? To answer the ques-
tion, we consider an example. Suppose that, in the near future, a small group of humans
leaves earth on a space ship and, after drifting through space for several generations, es-
tablishes a colony on a planet that belongs to a distant star. The colonists lose contact
with Earth and, in all possible alternatives, the two groups have nothing to do with each
other from then on. No decision made by the members of either group aﬀects the other in
any way.
Now suppose that the colonists are considering an important social decision and want
to know which of the associated alternatives is best. If the population principle satisﬁes
existence independence, the other group can be disregarded: the ranking of the feasible
alternatives is independent of its existence and, therefore, of both the number and utility
levels of its members. In this case, the population principle can be applied to the colonists
alone.
If, however, the population principle satisﬁes utility independence but not existence
independence, the ranking of the feasible alternatives depends on the number of people in
the other group even though the number is unaﬀected by the decisions under consideration.
And, if the population principle satisﬁes same-number independence only, the ranking of
the feasible alternatives depends on the utility levels or number of people in the other
group, as is the case for average utilitarianism.
We ﬁnd existence independence ethically attractive because of examples such as the
ones discussed above. An argument for utility independence could be made, however; it
would focus on the total number of people who ever live. For that reason, the numbers of
the long dead, of unaﬀected independent groups or of unaﬀected people in the far future
would count in social rankings.
7 In intertemporal settings, we call a related axiom ‘independence of the utilities of the dead’. Hammond
[1988] and McMahan [1981] have suggested similar axioms.
6
Existence independence is attractive for practical reasons as well. Information about
the number and utility levels of the long dead or of future people whose existence and
well-being are unaﬀected by decisions taken in the present is very diﬃcult to obtain.
For that reason alone, we might want to use population principles that satisfy existence
independence and do not need such information.
2.2. Nonnegative Critical Levels
If an alternative has a negative critical level, then, because of strong Pareto, the addi-
tion of someone whose utility is between the critical level and zero to a utility-unaﬀected
population is regarded as good. Thus, principles with negative critical levels sometimes
recommend the ceteris-paribus creation of people whose lives are not worth living.
We therefore adopt an axiom which we call nonnegative critical levels and it has an
obvious justiﬁcation.8 Because its critical levels are all zero, classical utilitarianism passes
this test. But average utilitarianism has critical levels that are equal to average utility
and, for alternatives with negative average utility, critical levels are negative. Thus, if an
existing population of two people has utility levels of 6 and −14, its critical level is −4
and the addition of a person whose utility level is −2 is ranked as desirable.
2.3. The Repugnant Conclusion
A population principle implies the repugnant conclusion (Parﬁt [1976,1982,1984])9 if any
alternative in which each member of the population has a positive utility level, no matter
how large, is ranked as worse than an alternative in which a suﬃciently large population
has a utility level that is above neutrality but arbitrarily close to it. Such principles may
recommend the creation of a large population in which each person is poverty stricken. As
Heyd [1992, p. 57] remarks, “What is the good in a world swarming with people having
lives barely worth living, even if overall the aggregation of the ‘utility’ of its members
supersedes that of any alternative, smaller world?”
Classical utilitarianism leads to the repugnant conclusion and this is a powerful crit-
icism. It is possible to show that any principle which satisﬁes our basic axioms, is weakly
inequality averse and has critical levels that are all nonpositive implies the repugnant con-
clusion.10 It follows that, if the repugnant conclusion is to be avoided, some critical levels
must be positive. Average utilitarianism is a principle which has some positive critical
levels and does not imply the repugnant conclusion.
8 Sikora’s [1978] Pareto-plus axiom requires the ceteris-paribus addition of a person whose lifetime-
utility level is above neutrality to be ranked as an improvement. In conjunction with the basic axioms
and nonnegative critical levels, his axiom implies that all critical levels must be zero.
9 See also Cowen [1996].
10 See Arrhenius [2000], Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998], Blackorby and Donaldson
[1991], Carlson [1998], McMahan [1981] and Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984].
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We therefore adopt an axiom which we call avoidance of the repugnant conclusion.
Its most obvious eﬀect is to rule out classical utilitarianism.
2.4. The Sadistic Conclusion
Arrhenius [2000] has suggested that population principles should avoid the sadistic con-
clusion which obtains if and only if every alternative in which each person has a negative
utility level is ranked as better than an alternative in which each person in a suﬃciently
large population has a level above neutrality. Such principles rank alternatives in which
each person is below neutrality as better than some alternatives in which each person is
above it. This suggests that population principles should satisfy an axiom which we call
avoidance of the sadistic conclusion.11
A stronger axiom would require a population principle to rank all alternatives in which
each person is above neutrality as better than all those in which each person is below it.
As we shall see, all of the restricted principles satisfy this but, because our impossibility
result does not need the stronger version, we do not use it.
3. Welfarist Population Principles
A welfarist population principle provides a single ordering of utility vectors which is used,
along with information about well-being associated with alternatives, to order them. Many
principles have value functions that are able to do the same job. Classical utilitarianism,
for example, declares one utility vector to be at least as good as another if and only if the
sum of utilities in the ﬁrst is at least as great as the sum of utilities in the second. Thus,
the sum of utilities is a value function which represents the classical-utilitarian ordering of
utility vectors. If a principle has a value function, one alternative is better than another
if and only if the value of the ﬁrst, as measured by the function, is greater than the value
of the second. In addition, the two alternatives are equally good if and only if their values
are the same.
Not all population principles that satisfy our basic axioms have value functions. In
order to guarantee the existence of such a function, an extension of continuity to diﬀerent
numbers can be used (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001b]). All of the principles
discussed in this paper have value functions and all but a few satisfy the extended conti-
nuity axiom. The mathematical results that we summarize below do not, however, require
extended continuity.
If a principle satisﬁes same-number independence, then its same-number subprinciples
must be generalized utilitarian: one utility vector is at least as good as another of the same
11 A related axiom requires principles to avoid the ‘reverse repugnant conclusion’, which is also implied
by all principles that imply the sadistic conclusion. It is diﬃcult to see why it is repugnant and, for that
reason, we have omitted it. See Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998] and Carlson [1998].
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dimension if and only if the sum of transformed utilities is at least as great in the ﬁrst.12
A continuous and increasing function is used to transform utilities and, if it is (strictly)
concave, the principle expresses (strict) aversion to utility inequality. Such a transform
might give a greater weight to the utilities of those who are below neutrality, for example.
Without loss of generality, the transform can be chosen so that the transformed value of
zero is zero. Same-number independence does not imply that the transforms used are the
same for all population sizes, but both utility and existence independence do imply that
(Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000]). Consequently, if same-number independence
is the only independence axiom used, it is necessary to assume directly that the transforms
are the same for diﬀerent population sizes.
All principles whose same-number subprinciples are utilitarian are also principles
whose same-number subprinciples are generalized utilitarian but the utilitarian same-
number orderings are not implied by any of our independence axioms. The axiom incre-
mental equity is suﬃcient for same-number utilitarianism. It demands impartiality with
respect to utility increases or decreases. If a single individual’s utility level changes by a
given amount, the goodness or badness of the change does not depend on the identity who
receives the increment. Incremental equity and weak Pareto (an increase in each person’s
well-being is ranked as an improvement) together characterize same-number utilitarianism
(Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001a, Theorem 12]).
The representative utility for a utility vector is that level of utility which, if assigned
to each person, produces a vector which is as good as the original. If a principle’s same-
number subprinciples are utilitarian, representative utility is average utility. If a principle
has a value function, it can be written in terms of representative utility and population
size.13 The value function must be increasing in representative utility but its response
to population size may be diﬀerent (increasing, decreasing or unresponsive) for diﬀerent
levels of representative utility.
Carter [1999] (and, implicitly, Parﬁt [1984]) has suggested that value functions for
principles whose same-number subprinciples are utilitarian should be expressible in terms
of average utility and total utility. Because population size is equal to total utility divided
by average utility, the value function for any principle that has one can be written in
terms of average utility and population size or in terms of average and total utility. Carter
suggests, however, that the value function should be increasing in both average and total
utility. We show in the appendix (Theorem 1) that any principle with this property has
12 See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995, 2001a].
13 See Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [2001b] for suﬃcient conditions on general population principles—
not necessarily same-number utilitarian—that guarantee the existence of a value function.
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some negative critical levels. Consequently, if value functions are written in terms of aver-
age and total utility, they should not be increasing in both. For simplicity of presentation,
however, we work with the representative-utility – population-size representation.
Although we do not require it, all welfarist principles can be extended to cover the null
alternative, the one in which no one ever lives. This can be accomplished by specifying a
critical level for the null alternative (see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000]). All the
principles discussed below are members of larger families whose same-number subprinciples
are generalized utilitarian. In this paper, we discuss only principles whose same-number
subprinciples are utilitarian and refer the reader to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
[2000] for their generalized counterparts.
3.1. Classical Utilitarianism
The value function for classical utilitarianism (CU) is the sum of utilities. Consequently,
one alternative is better than another if and only if the sum of the utilities of those who
ever live is greater in it. The value function for CU can also be written as the product
of population size and average utility. As a consequence, if average utility is constant,
increases in population size are good if average utility is positive and bad if average utility
is negative.
Classical utilitarianism is illustrated in Figure 1. The dotted lines join points of equal
value and we refer to the resulting curves as isovalue curves. Points on isovalue curve I are
better than points on II which are better than points on III which are better than points
on IV. The four curves join average-utility – population-size pairs which are as good as
utility vectors in which one person has a utility level of sixty, thirty, zero and minus thirty
respectively.
Because the addition of an individual with a utility level of zero to a utility-unaﬀected
population does not change total utility, all critical levels are equal to zero. Classical
utilitarianism satisﬁes existence independence (and, therefore, utility and same-number
independence), has nonnegative critical levels and avoids the sadistic conclusion. As is well
known, however, it leads to the repugnant conclusion. The repugnant conclusion is implied
because the isovalue curve for any average-utility – population-size pair with positive
average utility approaches the population-size axis as numbers increase. This is true of
isovalue curves I and II in Figure 1. As a consequence, it is possible to ﬁnd a population
size such that an arbitrarily small average-utility level paired with that population size is
ranked as better.
10
3.2. Critical-Level Utilitarianism
Critical-level utilitarianism (CLU) is a family of population principles, one for each value
of a ﬁxed level of utility which is the critical level for every alternative (Blackorby and
Donaldson [1984], Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995, 1998]). If the critical level is
zero, classical utilitarianism results. The value function can be computed by subtracting
the critical level from average utility and multiplying by population size or by subtracting
the critical level from the utility level of each person and adding.
Critical-level utilitarianism with a critical level of thirty is illustrated in Figure 2.
The four isovalue curves are constructed in the same way as the isovalue curves of Figure
1. If average utility is constant, increases in population size are good if average utility is
above the critical level and bad if average utility is below the critical level. Any alternative
with average utility above the critical level is ranked as better than any alternative with
average utility below it.
Isovalue curves for average-utility – population-size pairs with average utility above
the critical level do not drop below isovalue curve II. If the critical level is positive, there-
fore, CLU avoids the repugnant conclusion and has nonnegative critical levels.
If avoidance of the repugnant conclusion is regarded as desirable, a critical-level utili-
tarian principle with a positive critical level should be chosen. Any such principle leads to
the sadistic conclusion, however. This can be seen in Figure 2 by looking at isovalue curve
IV, which crosses the population-size axis from below and stays above it. Any alternative
in which one person is alive with a utility level of minus thirty is ranked as better than any
alternative in which each of four people has a utility level of ten. A similar comparison
can be found for any alternative in which population size is arbitrary and each person’s
utility level is negative.
In the example of Table 1, the one-child alternative x is better than the two-child
alternative y if and only if the critical level is greater than one. In addition, it is easy to
check that the ranking of the two alternatives is independent of the existence of Euclid
and, therefore, of his utility level. If CLU with a critical level of two is applied to the
family alone, values are 7 for x and 6 for y.
Critical-level utilitarianism satisﬁes existence independence and, therefore, utility and
same-number independence. In addition, the critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles
are the only ones that satisfy our basic axioms and existence independence (Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson [2001a, Theorem 16]; see also Blackorby and Donaldson [1984] and
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995]). Existence independence implies that critical
levels are the same for all alternatives. If a single individual is added to a utility-unaﬀected
population at the critical level, the two alternatives are equally good by deﬁnition of the
critical level. Because the utility levels of the original population are the same in both
alternatives, existence independence requires the ranking of the two alternatives to be
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independent of both utilities and population size. Consequently, the critical level for
the original alternative must be the critical level for all alternatives. Avoidance of the
repugnant conclusion requires a positive critical level in both the generalized-utilitarian
and utilitarian cases.
3.3. Restricted Critical-Level Utilitarianism
Critical-level-utilitarian principles with positive critical levels can be modiﬁed so that all
members of the resulting family avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. The
positive critical level for a CLU principle becomes the critical-level parameter for the cor-
responding restricted principle. The value function is given by the CLU value function if
average utility is greater than the critical-level parameter, by average utility divided by
the parameter less one if average utility is positive and no greater than the parameter, and
by total utility less one if average utility is nonpositive. It is illustrated for a parameter
value of thirty in Figure 3 (isovalue curves I–IV are deﬁned as before and isovalue curve
V is added). We call the resulting family restricted critical-level utilitarianism (RCLU).
It ranks alternatives whose average utilities are greater than thirty using CLU (isovalue
curve I), alternatives whose average utilities are positive and no greater than thirty using
average utilitarianism (isovalue curves II and V), and alternatives whose average utilities
are nonpositive with classical utilitarianism (isovalue curves III and IV). In addition, al-
ternatives in the ﬁrst group are ranked as better than those in the second which, in turn,
are ranked as better than those in the third.
Suppose average utility is constant. If it is above the critical-level parameter, popula-
tion increases are good, if it is nonnegative and no greater than the parameter, population
increases are neither good nor bad, and if it is negative, population increases are bad.
Critical levels are equal to the critical-level parameter for alternatives whose average
utility is above it, average utility for alternatives whose average utility is positive and no
greater than the parameter, and zero for alternatives whose average utility is nonpositive.
Consequently, all critical levels are nonnegative.
Because the isovalue curves for average-utility – population-size pairs with average
utility above the parameter do not approach the population-size axis (isovalue curves such
as I are bounded below by II), the repugnant conclusion is avoided. In addition, because
the isovalue curves for average-utility – population-size pairs with negative average utilities
such as IV do not cross the population-size axis, the sadistic conclusion is avoided.
These principles satisfy neither utility nor existence independence. Consider, again,
the example of the disabled child summarized in Table 1 and suppose that RCLU with
the critical-level parameter equal to two is used to rank x and y. If Euclid’s utility level
is 10, average utility is 7 in x and 6.5 in y which are both greater than 2. Consequently,
values are 15 for x and 18 for y, and the alternative with one child is better. Now suppose
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that Euclid’s utility level is −14. Then average utilities are −1 for x and −1/2 for y and
values are −4 for x and −3 for y and the two-child alternative is better. Consequently,
utility independence is not satisﬁed and, because existence independence implies utility
independence, it is also not satisﬁed.
3.4. Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Utilitarianism
The number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian (NCLU) family of principles allows critical
levels to depend on population size but not on utility levels and includes the critical-level
utilitarian family as a special case. We write the critical level for population size n as cn.
If the null alternative is covered, its critical level is c0 and if it is not, c0 can be chosen
arbitrarily (it makes no diﬀerence to the rankings). The NCLU value function for an
alternative with population size n can be found by subtracting the average of c0, . . . , cn−1
from average utility and multiplying by population size. Equivalently, it can be found by
adding the ﬁrst utility level less c0, the second less c1, and so on.
Number-sensitive critical-level utilitarianism is illustrated in Figure 4. Critical levels
are zero for population size one and thirty for population sizes greater than one. If average
utility is constant, population increases are bad for average-utility – population-size pairs
that lie below isovalue curve III (and have negative average utility) but, for pairs that
are above curve III, the goodness or badness of population-size increases is ambiguous
and depends on how large the population is. In the ﬁgure, NCLU coincides with CU for
population sizes one and two and, as population size becomes large, it approximates CLU
with a critical level of thirty.
Satisfaction of nonnegative critical levels requires all critical levels to be nonnegative.
In this case, the repugnant conclusion is avoided if and only if there is a sequence of
population sizes such that the sequence of corresponding critical levels does not approach
zero (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000, Theorem 7]). If, in addition, critical levels
are nondecreasing, the repugnant conclusion is avoided if and only if there is at least one
positive critical level. Nondecreasingness of critical levels ensures, in that case, that all
the critical levels for higher population sizes are positive.
If critical levels are not all the same, utility independence is satisﬁed but existence
independence is not. To see that, consider the disabled-child example summarized in Table
1 and suppose that critical levels are equal to zero for population sizes one to three and
nine for population sizes above three. Without loss of generality, c0 may be chosen to be
zero. Writing Euclid’s utility level as ξ, values are 11 + ξ for x and 12 + ξ for y and y
is better than x for all values of ξ. Suppose, now, that we discover that Euclid had an
identical twin brother whose lifetime utility level was also equal to ξ. In that case, values
are 11+2ξ for x and 3+2ξ for y so x is better. Although the ranking of the two alternatives
is independent of the utilities of the Euclids, it is not independent of their number.
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The number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles are the only ones
that satisfy our basic axioms and utility independence (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
[2000, Theorem 3]). Avoidance of the repugnant conclusion requires the same conditions
on critical levels as those for NCLU.
All members of the number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian family that avoid the
repugnant conclusion imply the sadistic conclusion (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
[2000, Theorem 19]). This can be seen in Figure 4 by noting that isovalue curve IV crosses
the population-size axis. We show, in the following subsection, that it is possible to modify
these principles so that they imply neither but, in that case, neither existence nor utility
independence is satisﬁed.
3.5. Restricted Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Utilitarianism
The restricted number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian (RNCLU) family of principles is
a modiﬁcation of the number-sensitive subfamily with nonnegative, nondecreasing critical
levels and at least one positive critical level. It uses the critical levels for NCLU as
parameters and we write c¯n as the average of c0, . . . , cn−1 where c0 is nonnegative. The
value function is equal to the value of the corresponding NCLU value function if average
utility is greater than c¯n, equal to average utility divided by c¯n less one if average utility
is positive and no greater than c¯n, and equal to total utility less one if average utility is
nonpositive. RNCLU with c0 = c1 = c2 = 0 and cn = 30 for all population sizes greater
than two is illustrated in Figure 5. Note that there are no average-utility – population-size
pairs on isovalue curve V for population sizes one and two. This occurs when some of the
critical-level parameters are zero and some are positive and does not occur when all are
positive. All average-utility – population-size pairs with average utility greater than c¯n
are better than all pairs with positive average utility that is no greater than c¯n and these
are, in turn, better than all pairs in which average utility is nonpositive. RNCLU ranks
alternatives with average utilities above c¯n with the corresponding NCLU principle and
alternatives with nonpositive average utilities with CU.
The critical level for an alternative with population size n is cn if average utility
is greater than c¯n, positive and no greater than c¯n if average utility is positive and no
greater than c¯n, and zero if average utility is nonpositive. Consequently, all of the RNCLU
principles satisfy nonnegative critical levels.
The repugnant conclusion is avoided if and only if the corresponding NCLU principle
avoids it. This is guaranteed because the critical-level parameters are nondecreasing and
at least one is positive.
All of the restricted number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian principles avoid the
sadistic conclusion. The reason is that all alternatives with negative average utility are
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ranked as worse than all those with positive average utility. An example is provided by
isovalue curve IV in Figure 5: it does not cross the population-size axis.
All restricted number-sensitive principles satisfy neither existence nor utility indepen-
dence. An example is provided by the one discussed in connection with the RCLU family
because those principles also belong to the RNCLU family.
3.6. Average Utilitarianism
Average utilitarianism (AU) ranks alternatives with a value function which is equal to
average utility. It is illustrated in Figure 6. The ﬂat isovalue curves indicate that, if
average utility is constant, the principle is indiﬀerent to changes in population size. As a
consequence, the principle makes some stark trade-oﬀs: an alternative with a population
of any size in which each person is equally well oﬀ is ranked as worse than an alternative
in which one person enjoys a trivially higher utility level.
Because the addition of a single person whose utility level is equal to the average
utility of an unaﬀected population does not change average utility, the critical level for
any alternative is average utility. Consequently, critical levels for alternatives with negative
average utilities are negative and the axiom nonnegative critical levels is not satisﬁed.
Isovalue curves for alternatives in which average utility is positive do not approach
the population-size axis, and this means that the repugnant conclusion is avoided. In
addition, all alternatives with positive average utility are ranked as better than all those
with negative average utility and, as a consequence, the sadistic conclusion is avoided.
The discussion of average utilitarianism following the disabled-child example summarized
in Table 1 demonstrates that AU satisﬁes neither utility nor existence independence.
3.7. Number-Dampened Utilitarianism
The number-dampened utilitarian (NDU) family (Ng [1986]) has both classical and average
utilitarianism as members. Its value function is equal to average utility multiplied by a
positive-valued function of population size. If the function is equal to population size or
any positive multiple, the principle is CU and, if the function is equal to any positive
constant, AU results.
It is possible for an NDU principle to approximate CU for ‘small’ population sizes
and AU for ‘large’ ones, a property originally suggested by Hurka [1983]. Such a case is
illustrated in Figure 7. For that principle, the function takes on the values 1, 2, 2.6 and
3 for population sizes one, two, three, and four or more respectively. For population sizes
one and two, the principle coincides with CU and, for population sizes of four or more,
the principle coincides with AU.
It can be shown (see the appendix) that critical levels for NDU are equal to a multiple
of average utility and that the multiple can depend on population size. In the example of
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Figure 7, the ratios of critical levels to average utility are 0, .31, .47 and 1 for for population
sizes one, two, three, and four or more.
An important case specializes NDU in a way that is parallel to the way that constant
critical levels specialize number-sensitive critical-level utilitarianism. In that subfamily,
the ratio of critical levels to average utilities is a positive constant between zero and one.
Because critical levels for the NDU principles are equal to a multiple of average utility,
they have some negative critical levels unless the ratio is equal to zero (Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [2000, Theorem 12]). In that case, however, the principle is CU: all other
members of the family have some negative critical levels.
Some members of the NDU family, such as CU, imply the repugnant conclusion and
others, such as AU, do not. We have been able to prove that all of the NDU principles for
which the ratio of critical levels to average utilities is a positive constant between zero and
one lead to the repugnant conclusion (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000, Theorem
17]). In the case that the ratio is nonconstant, the requirement that it be nondecreasing
is consistent with Hurka’s suggestion (Hurka [1983]). In order to avoid the repugnant
conclusion, any NDU principle for which the ratio of critical levels to average utilities is
a nondecreasing, positive real number between zero and one must approximate average
utilitarianism as population size becomes large (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000,
Theorem 18]).
Because every NDU principle ranks all alternatives with positive average utilities as
better than all alternatives with negative average utilities, all of the NDU principles avoid
the sadistic conclusion.
Every member of the number-dampened utilitarian and the number-dampened genera-
lized-utilitarian families satisﬁes same-number independence. None of them other than
classical utilitarianism and classical generalized utilitarianism satisfy either utility or ex-
istence independence. This follows from the fact that utility independence, together with
our basic axioms, characterizes the number-sensitive critical-level generalized utilitarian
family (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000, Theorem 2]). The only principles in
that family that are also members of the number-dampened generalized-utilitarian family
are the classical generalized-utilitarian principles. Because the only classical generalized-
utilitarian principle in the number-dampened utilitarian family is CU, the result follows.
3.8. Restricted Number-Dampened Utilitarianism
Suggested by Hurka [2000], the restricted number-dampened utilitarian (RNDU) family
of principles provides a partial solution to one of the most important diﬃculties of the
number-dampened family, namely that all those principles other than CU have negative
critical levels.
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The value function for the restricted principles coincides with the NDU value function
when average utility is positive and with the CU value function when average utility is
nonpositive. The restricted version of the example of Figure 7 is illustrated in Figure 8.
Above the population-size axis, the isovalue curves are the same for both principles. But,
below the population-size axis, isovalue curves for the restricted principle approach the
population-size axis for large population sizes, reﬂecting the fact that the value function
coincides with the CU value function for negative average utilities.
Because of this, critical levels for alternatives with nonpositive average utilities are
all zero and, hence, nonnegative. Critical levels for alternatives with positive average util-
ities are not necessarily nonnegative, however. Suppose that the function that multiplies
average utility takes on the values one and four for population sizes one and two and
consider an alternative in which a single person has a utility level of four. Then, because
the average of four and minus two multiplied by four is equal to four, the critical level
is minus two. For any NDU principle, Theorem 14 in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
[2000] demonstrates that the ratios of critical levels to average utilities are nonnegative if
and only if the ratio of the function that multiplies average utility to population size does
not increase as population size increases. This condition, applied to RNDU principles, is
clearly necessary and suﬃcient for nonnegative critical levels.
Two special cases of RNDU have, however, nonnegative critical levels for all alter-
natives. The ﬁrst of these is restricted average utilitarianism (RAU). Its value function
is equal to average utility when average utility is positive and total utility when average
utility is nonpositive. Its critical levels are equal to average utility for alternatives with
positive average utility and zero for alternatives whose average utility is nonpositive. The
restricted version of the NDU family for which the ratio of critical levels to average utilities
is a positive constant between zero and one also has nonnegative critical levels: they are
equal to the positive constant when average utility is positive and to zero when average
utility is nonpositive.
The repugnant conclusion refers to alternatives with positive average utilities only.
Because value functions for the restricted number-dampened utilitarian principles coincide
with the value functions for their unrestricted counterparts when average utility is positive,
the conditions for avoidance of the repugnant conclusion are the same for the restricted
and unrestricted families.
As is the case for the NDU principles, all members of the RNDU family rank all
alternatives with positive average utilities as better than all those with negative average
utilities. Consequently, they all avoid the sadistic conclusion.
Of all the RNDU principles, only classical utilitarianism satisﬁes utility independence.
This observation follows from the discussion of independence and the NDU principles.
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4. Which Principles Are Best?
It is interesting to ask whether the axioms that we have presented tell us which principles
are best. To investigate that question, we have summarized the results of the previous
section in Table 2. The table is divided into two sections: the ﬁrst lists families of princi-
ples that can be regarded as generalizations of CU and the second list families that can be
thought of as generalizations of AU. The ﬁrst group consists of all the unrestricted and re-
stricted critical-level families and the second consists of all the unrestricted and restricted
number-dampened families. In the second group, we have included restricted average util-
itarianism (RAU) which is a member of the restricted number-dampened family and three
cases of number-dampened principles and their restricted counterparts. The ﬁrst group of
number-dampened principles consists of the whole of the NDU family, the second selects
members of the family in which the ratio of critical levels to average utilities is equal to
a positive constant between zero and one and the third selects NDU principles for which
the ratio of critical levels to average utilities is positive, nondecreasing and approaches
one as population size becomes large. The last group approximates AU as population size
increases. There is no principle in the list that satisﬁes all our axioms and it is worth
asking whether this a general result. The answer is ‘yes’ and we state it in the appendix
(Theorem 2; see also Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000, Theorem 10]). There is
no population principle that satisﬁes our basic axioms and utility independence, has non-
negative critical levels, and avoids both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. Because
existence independence implies utility independence and requires constant critical levels,
it is also true that there is no population principle that satisﬁes the basic axioms, existence
independence and avoidance of the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. In searching for
the best principles, therefore, we should bear in mind that no principle can be completely
satisfactory.
We regard negative critical levels as an unacceptable property of population principles
and use it to eliminate some of the subfamilies in the table. None of the families in
the ﬁrst group are eliminated but all of the unrestricted families in the second are. In
addition, the general case of restricted NDU principles is eliminated for the same reason.
As a consequence, we focus on restricted average utilitarianism and the second and third
restricted number-dampened families.
Many investigators, among them Heyd [1992] and Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984], make a
strong case for avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. If we accept that view, we may
eliminate classical utilitarianism and all but the last of the restricted versions of number-
dampened utilitarianism. The families that remain fall into two groups: those that satisfy
utility or existence independence but lead to the sadistic conclusion and those that satisfy
neither utility nor existence independence but do not imply the sadistic conclusion. We
consider the two groups in turn.
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The number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian family, which includes the critical-level
utilitarian family, is the only one that can satisfy utility independence and all axioms
other than avoidance of the sadistic conclusion. Of the members of this family that do not
imply the repugnant conclusion, the most attractive are those whose critical levels do not
decrease as population size increases. In that case, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion
requires critical levels to be positive after some population size is reached. If there is
more than one critical level, however, existence independence is not satisﬁed: it requires
constant utility levels. Therefore, if existence independence is thought to be desirable,
members of the critical-level family with positive critical levels are the only satisfactory
principles.
Although existence independence is attractive on both ethical and practical grounds,
the principles that satisfy it and avoid the repugnant conclusion necessarily imply the
sadistic conclusion. It is important to ask, therefore, whether avoidance of the sadistic
conclusion is important enough to make us abandon existence independence. Our view
is that it is not. To understand our ﬁrst reason, consider an alternative in which each
person has a negative utility level and choose any utility level that is positive but less than
the critical level. An alternative in which each person has this utility level and the same
number of people as the original is ranked as better by CLU with a positive critical level.
But, because the higher utility level is below the critical level, population increases with
added people at the same level are bad and it is possible to ﬁnd a larger population size
such that the resulting alternative is regarded as worse than the original one. But the
principle clearly states that such expansions are undesirable. Our second reason relies on
the fact that, in a set of feasible alternatives, an alternative that maximizes the CLU value
function is the most desirable. If there is a feasible alternative with average utility above
the critical level, it is best according to both CLU and its restricted counterpart. If the
average utility of those who ever live is above the critical level, therefore, we need not be
concerned with the sadistic conclusion.
It is important to note that, in our framework, axioms do not refer exclusively to those
who are presently alive. Theorem 2 shows that principles that satisfy nonnegative critical
levels, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion and avoidance of the sadistic conclusion
necessarily satisfy neither utility nor existence independence. Consequently, avoiding the
sadistic conclusion imposes informational demands that are very great. In the example of
the disabled child summarized in Table 1, we must have information about the long dead
in order to rank changes that aﬀect only present and future generations.
Suppose, however, that the view that both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions
should be avoided is accepted. If we restrict attention to principles with nonnegative criti-
cal levels, this requires us to give up both utility and existence independence. Subfamilies
in Table 2 that have the requisite characteristics are restricted critical-level utilitarianism,
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restricted number-dependent critical-level utilitarianism, restricted average utilitarianism
and restricted number-dampened utilitarianism in which the ratio of critical levels to av-
erage utility is positive, nondecreasing and approaches one as numbers increase.
Restricted average utilitarianism may be attractive to some, but it retains the stark
trade-oﬀs of AU for alternatives with positive average utilities and this leads us to reject
it. The third subfamily of the restricted NDU principles has its own problems, however.
All members of this subfamily other than RAU must have ratios of critical levels to av-
erage utilities that are diﬀerent for some population sizes. As a consequence, some moral
signiﬁcance must be attached to certain absolute numbers. If the principle approximates
CU at small population sizes and AU at large ones, some numerical meaning for ‘small’
and ‘large’ must be found so that the ‘speed’ of the transition between the two limiting
cases can be chosen. It is, however, very diﬃcult to imagine how this can be done with-
out reference to the carrying capacity of the solar system and universe. If that occurs,
then value becomes confounded with constraints. The same consideration applies to the
number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian principles. If this argument is accepted, we are
left with restricted CLU as the only satisfactory family whose members avoid both the
repugnant and sadistic conclusions.
If we were forced to choose between the CLU subfamily with positive critical levels
and restricted CLU, we would choose the former because we think that satisfaction of
existence independence is more important than avoidance of the sadistic conclusion. But
the choice may not be necessary. If we can somehow know that the average utility of those
who will ever live is above the critical-level parameter in all feasible alternatives, then the
RCLU and CLU rank them in the same way. We suspect, moreover, that, in practical
situations, decision makers will be forced to behave as if they had adopted a principle
that satisﬁes existence independence because of the unavailability of information. If our
conjecture is correct, the ethical decision that matters is the choice of a positive critical
level, not the choice between a restricted and an unrestricted CLU principle.
It is true, of course, that we do not have to choose principles whose same-number sub-
principles are utilitarian. Both the critical-level utilitarian and restricted critical-level utili-
tarian families are themselves members of two larger families: the critical-level generalized-
utilitarian and the restricted critical-level generalized-utilitarian families. The axioms we
have employed do not rule out the inequality aversion that generalized utilitarian families
can represent. In addition, the critical-level generalized-utilitarian subfamily with posi-
tive critical levels exhausts the possibilities for principles that satisfy the basic axioms,
existence independence and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion.
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APPENDIX
Let Z++ be the set of positive integers and let R be the set of real numbers. For n ∈ Z++,
Zn++ is the n-fold Cartesian product of Z++ and Rn is the n-fold Cartesian product of R.
The positive (negative) orthant of Rn is denoted by Rn++ (Rn−−). For n ∈ Z++, 1n is the
vector consisting of n ones. Individuals are indexed by positive integers. For all n ∈ Z++,
let Zn ⊂ Zn++ be the set of all π ∈ Zn++ such that πi = πj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We
use the notation Ω = ∪n∈Z++Rn. Letting u∅ denote the utility vector associated with the
alternative where no one is alive, we deﬁne Ω∅ = Ω ∪ {u∅}.
For each alternative, the associated population size is denoted by n ∈ Z++ and the
associated vector of individual identities by π = (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ Zn. Utilities for those alive
are u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Rn where, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ui is individual πi’s lifetime utility
in the alternative in question.
A welfarist population principle is represented by an ordering
∗
R on ∪n∈Z++(Zn×Rn)
where, for all (π, u), (ρ, v) ∈ ∪n∈Z++(Zn ×Rn), (π, u)
∗
R(ρ, v) means that (π, u) is at least
as good as (ρ, v). The better-than relation and the as-good-as relation corresponding to
∗
R are denoted by
∗
P and
∗
I respectively. Because
∗
R ranks named utility vectors, for any
n ∈ Z++, (π, u), (ρ, v) ∈ Zn×Rn, if ρ is a permutation of π and v is the same permutation
of u, the (π, u)
∗
I(ρ, v).
Our basic axioms are strong Pareto, continuity, anonymity, and existence of critical
levels. These conditions are deﬁned as follows.
Strong Pareto: For all n ∈ Z++, for all π ∈ Zn, for all u, v ∈ Rn, if ui ≥ vi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with at least one strict inequality, then (π, u) ∗P(π, v).
Continuity: For all n ∈ Z++, for all π ∈ Zn, for all u ∈ Rn, the sets {v ∈ Rn |
(π, v)
∗
R(π, u)} and {v ∈ Rn | (π, u) ∗R(π, v)} are closed.
Anonymity: For all n ∈ Z++, for all π, ρ ∈ Zn, for all u ∈ Rn, (π, u)∗I(ρ, u).
Existence of Critical Levels: For all n ∈ Z++, for all (π, u) ∈ Zn × Rn, there exist
j ∈ Z++ \ {π1, . . . , πn} and c ∈ R such that ((π, j), (u, c))∗I(π, u).
If
∗
R satisﬁes anonymity, it is isomorphic to an ordering R on Ω with better-than
and as-good-as relations P and I . This is the case because individual identities are irrel-
evant for anonymous social evaluation. That is, for all (π, u), (ρ, v) ∈ ∪n∈Z++(Zn ×Rn),
(π, u)
∗
R(ρ, v) if and only if uRv. Furthermore, the same-number restrictions of R must be
anonymous: if v is a permutation of u, uIv. Strong Pareto and continuity imply that these
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restrictions are strictly monotonic and continuous. From now on, we use R instead of
∗
R
for simplicity. This can be done without loss of generality because the four basic axioms
are maintained throughout.
Same-number independence requires that, for a ﬁxed population size, the relative
ranking of any two utility vectors is independent of the utilities of those individuals whose
utility levels are the same in both.
Same-Number Independence: For all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u, v ∈ Rn, for all w, s ∈ Rm,
(u, w)R(v, w)⇐⇒ (u, s)R(v, s). (1)
A stronger axiom extends same-number independence to diﬀerent-number compar-
isons and requires the social ranking to be independent of the utilities of unconcerned
individuals but not necessarily of their existence.
Utility Independence: For all u, v ∈ Ω∅, for all r ∈ Z++, for all w, s ∈ Rr,
(u, w)R(v, w)⇐⇒ (u, s)R(v, s). (2)
An extended version of the axiom also applies to diﬀerent-number comparisons. It
requires the social ranking to be independent of the existence of the unconcerned. Thus,
the ranking is independent of their utilities and their number.
Existence Independence: For all u, v, w ∈ Ω,
(u, w)R(v, w)⇐⇒ uRv. (3)
The requirement that critical levels be nonnegative is deﬁned as follows.
Nonnegative Critical Levels: For all u ∈ Ω, for all c ∈ R, if (u, c)Iu, then c ≥ 0.
A population principle implies the repugnant conclusion (Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984]) if
and only if, for any population size n ∈ Z++, any positive utility level ξ, and any utility
level ε ∈ (0, ξ), there exists a population size m > n such that an m-person alternative
in which every individual experiences utility level ε is ranked as better than an n-person
society in which every individual’s utility level is ξ. The axiom that requires the repugnant
conclusion to be avoided is deﬁned as follows.
Avoidance of the Repugnant Conclusion: There exist n ∈ Z++, ξ ∈ R++ and
ε ∈ (0, ξ) such that, for all m > n, ξ1nRε1m.
A population principle implies the sadistic conclusion (Arrhenius [2000]) if and only if,
for any population size n ∈ Z++ and any negative utility level ξ, there exist a population
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size m > n and a positive utility level ε such that an alternative in which n people
experience utility level ξ is better than an alternative in which m people experience ε.
Avoidance of the Sadistic Conclusion: There exist n ∈ Z++ and ξ ∈ R−− such that,
for all m > n and for all ε ∈ R++, ε1mRξ1n.
For population size n and an n-person utility vector u, we write average utility as
µ = µn(u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ui. (4)
According to same-number utilitarianism, two utility vectors of the same population size
are ranked by their average or total utilities. For the population principles considered here
(which have same-number utilitarian subprinciples), the value function W can be written
in terms of population size n and average utility µ. That is, utility vector u is at least
as good as utility vector v if and only if the value of W calculated at the population
size and average utility of u is greater than or equal to the value of W calculated at the
population-size – average-utility pair corresponding to v. Formally, for all n,m ∈ Z++,
for all u ∈ Rn, for all v ∈ Rm,
uRv ⇐⇒W (n, µn(u)) ≥ W (m,µm(v)). (5)
We now present value functions for the population principles we investigate.
Classical utilitarianism (CU) uses total utility as the criterion to rank utility vectors,
and we obtain the value function
WCU (n, µ) = nµ =
n∑
i=1
ui. (6)
For classical utilitarianism, all critical levels are equal to zero, the utility level that repre-
sents neutrality.
Critical-level utilitarianism (CLU) is a family of principles, one for each value of a
ﬁxed utility level which is the critical level for every alternative.14 The CLU value functions
are given by
WCLU (n, µ) = n(µ− α) =
n∑
i=1
(ui − α) (7)
where α ∈ R is the critical level for the particular principle represented by the function. If
the critical level α is zero, classical utilitarianism results and, therefore, CU is a member
of the CLU family. A CLU principle avoids the repugnant conclusion if and only if α is
positive.
14 The CLU principles are introduced in Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]. See Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [1995, 1998] for further discussions.
23
The restricted critical-level utilitarian (RCLU) family of principles is introduced in
this paper. Its value functions are given by
WRCLU (n, µ) =


n(µ− α) =∑ni=1(ui − α) if µ > α,
µ/α − 1 =∑ni=1 ui/(nα) − 1 if 0 < µ ≤ α,
nµ− 1 =∑ni=1 ui − 1 if µ ≤ 0,
(8)
where α is positive. WRCLU is equal to the value function for CLU for all average utilities
that are greater than α, equal to the percentage shortfall of average utility from α when
average utility is positive and less than or equal to α, and equal to total utility less one
when average utility is nonpositive. Consequently, all alternatives whose average utility
is above the critical-level parameter are better than all whose average utility is positive
and no greater than it and these alternatives are, in turn, better than all whose average
utilities are nonpositive. Critical levels are equal to α for all alternatives in the ﬁrst set,
average utility for those in the second, and zero for those in the third. All RCLU principles
avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions.
The number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian (NCLU) family is a generalization of
the CLU family.15 Its critical levels are independent of utility levels but not necessarily
independent of population size. We write the critical level for population size n as cn.
Because the null alternative is not considered, c0 is an arbitrary real number (the number
chosen makes no diﬀerence to rankings in this case).16 The value functions for the NCLU
principles can be written as
WNCLU (n, µ) = n(µ− c¯n) =
n∑
i=1
(ui − ci−1) (9)
where
c¯n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci−1. (10)
c¯n is the average of c0 and the critical levels for population sizes 1 to n − 1. CLU results
from making c0 and all the critical levels equal to the same real number, so that c¯n is equal
to α, the ﬁxed critical level.
Members of the restricted number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian family (RNCLU),
the second family introduced in this paper, are represented by value functions that are
generalizations of those for RCLU and they are derived from those for NCLU. c¯n is deﬁned
15 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000].
16 If the null alternative were included, c0 would be its critical level.
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by (10) and we assume that c0 ≥ 0, the cn are nondecreasing, and at least one cn is positive.
The value functions can be written as
WRNCLU (n, µ) =


n(µ− c¯n) =
∑n
i=1(ui − ci−1) if µ > c¯n,
µ/c¯n − 1 =∑ni=1 ui/∑ni=1 ci−1 − 1 if 0 < µ ≤ c¯n,
nµ− 1 =∑ni=1 ui − 1 if µ ≤ 0.
(11)
It is possible to have c¯n = 0 for some n and, in that case, the middle branch of (11) does
not apply. Although the ordering of population-size – average-utility pairs represented by
the NCLU value functions is independent of the choice of c0 when the null alternative is
not included, that is not true of RNCLU: the point at which the value function switches
between the ﬁrst and second branches is determined by c¯n which depends on c0. If cn = α >
0 for all n (including zero), the principle is restricted critical-level utilitarian. All critical
levels exist for the RNCLU principles. For alternatives with average utility above c¯n, the
critical level is cn, for alternatives with positive average utility that is no greater than c¯n,
the critical level can be found by multiplying cn/c¯n by average utility and, for alternatives
with nonpositive average utility, the critical level is zero. All RNCLU principles avoid
both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions.
The value function for average utilitarianism (AU) is average utility, that is,
WAU (n, µ) = µ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ui. (12)
Critical levels exist for all utility vectors and are equal to average utility.
The number-dampened utilitarian (NDU) family (Ng [1986]) includes both average
and classical utilitarianism as members. Its value functions can be written as
WNDU (n, µ) = f(n)µ =
f(n)
n
n∑
i=1
ui, (13)
where f is a positive-valued function of population size. If f(n) = n or any positive
multiple, CU results and, if f(n) is independent of n, AU results. Critical levels for NDU
are equal to multiples of average utility and the multiple can depend on population size.
The critical level c for an alternative with population size n and average utility µ satisﬁes
f(n)µ = f(n + 1)
nµ + c
n+ 1
. (14)
Consequently,
c = h(n)µ =
[
f(n)(n+ 1) − f(n+ 1)n
f(n+ 1)
]
µ. (15)
The function h must satisfy h(n) > −n for all n (Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [2000,
Theorem 11]).
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Restricted number-dampened utilitarianism (Hurka [2000]) uses the value function
WRNDU (n, µ) =
{
f(n)µ = f(n)
∑n
i=1 ui/n if µ > 0,
nµ =
∑n
i=1 ui if µ ≤ 0.
(16)
These principles coincide with number-dampened utilitarianism for positive average util-
ities and with classical utilitarianism for nonpositive average-utility levels. Critical levels
are given by (15) for alternatives with positive average utilities and are equal to zero for all
others. All RNDU principles avoid the sadistic conclusion but not all avoid the repugnant
conclusion.
Instead of the value function W , a value function V which depends on average utility
µ and total utility τ = nµ can be employed to represent population principles. Provided
that average utility is nonzero, V (τ, µ) = W (τ/µ, µ). It has been suggested that the
value function should be increasing in both total utility and average utility (see, for exam-
ple, Carter [1999]). If this monotonicity requirement is combined with our basic axioms
strong Pareto, anonymity and existence of critical levels, then some critical levels must be
negative. Therefore, we obtain the following impossibility result.
Theorem 1: There is no population principle that satisﬁes strong Pareto, anonymity,
existence of critical levels, and nonnegative critical levels if the associated value function
V exists and is increasing in total utility and average utility.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that R is an ordering satisfying the axioms in
the theorem statement (R can be used rather than
∗
R because of anonymity). Consider
the utility vector ξ1n with n ∈ Z++ and ξ < 0. Because the value function V is increasing
in average utility, we have (ξ1n, 0)Pξ1n because, in moving from ξ1n to (ξ1n, 0), average
utility increases and total utility is unchanged. Furthermore, ξ1nPξ1n+1 because average
utility is unchanged and total utility decreases when moving from ξ1n to ξ1n+1. By strong
Pareto, the critical level c for ξ1n must satisfy ξ < c < 0, contradicting nonnegative critical
levels.
We conclude with a second impossibility result due to Blackorby, Bossert and Don-
aldson [2000, Theorem 10]. It establishes an incompatibility between avoidance of the
repugnant and sadistic conclusions and utility independence, given our basic axioms.
Theorem 2: There is no population principle that satisﬁes strong Pareto, continuity,
anonymity, existence of critical levels, utility independence, nonnegative critical levels,
avoidance of the repugnant conclusion and avoidance of the sadistic conclusion.
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The theorem of Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000] is slightly stronger because
existence of critical levels can be weakened to an axiom that requires only the existence,
for each population size, of one utility vector with a critical level.
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Table 2
Same-Number Utility Existence Nonnegative Avoidance of the Avoidance of the
Independence Independence Independence Critical Levels Repugnant Conclusion Sadistic Conclusion
CU1 • • • • •
CLU2 • • • • •
RCLU3 • • • •
NCLU4 • • • •
RNCLU5 • • • •
AU6 • • •
RAU7 • • • •
NDU8 • •
RNDU9 • •
NDU10 • •
RNDU11 • • •
NDU12 • • •
RNDU13 • • • •
1. Classical Utilitarianism
2. Critical-Level Utilitarianism: positive critical level
3. Restricted Critical-Level Utilitarianism: positive critical-level parameter
4. Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Utilitarianism: nonnegative, nondecreasing critical levels and some positive
critical levels
5. Restricted Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Utilitarianism: restricted version of 4
6. Average Utilitarianism
7. Restricted Average Utilitarianism
8. Number-Dampened Utilitarianism: general case
9. Restricted Number-Dampened Utilitarianism: general case
10. Number-Dampened Utilitarianism: ratio of critical level to average utility is a positive constant between
zero and one
11. Restricted Number-Dampened Utilitarianism: restricted version of 10
12. Number-Dampened Utilitarianism: ratio of critical level to average utility is positive, nondecreasing and
approaches one as numbers increase
13. Restricted Number-Dampened Utilitarianism: restricted version of 12
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60 I
30 II
III Population
0
1 2 3 4 Size
−30 IV
Figure 1: Classical Utilitarianism
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Figure 2: Critical-Level Utilitarianism
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Figure 3: Restricted Critical-Level Utilitarianism
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Figure 4: Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Utilitarianism
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Figure 5: Restricted Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Utilitarianism
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Figure 6: Average Utilitarianism
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Figure 7: Number-Dampened Utilitarianism
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Figure 8: Restricted Number-Dampened Utilitarianism
